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Strategical languages of infinite words
M. Arfi, B. Ould M Lemine, C. Selmi ∗
Abstract: We deal in this paper with strategical languages of infinite words,
that is those generated by a nondeterministic strategy in the sense of game theory.
We first show the existence of a minimal strategy for such languages, for which we
give an explicit expression. Then we characterize the family of strategical languages
as that of closed ones, in the topological space of infinite words. Finally, we give a
definition of a Nash equilibrium for such languages, that we illustrate with a famous
example.
Keywords: Words, infinite words, formal languages, game theory, strategy, topology, Nash
equilibrium.
Introduction
Game theory [6] is usually defined as a mathematical tool used to analyze strategical
interaction, the game, between individuals which are called players. The games
studied in this paper are supposed simultaneous, noncooperative, infinitely repeated
and with a perfect knowledge of the previous moves. We will elucidate these ideas
through a famous example.
In game theory, the distinction between the cooperative and noncoperative game
is crucial. The Prisoner’s Dilemma [3] is an interesting example to explain these
notions. It is a game involving two players where each one has two possible actions
: cooperate (c) or defect (d). The game consists of simultaneous actions (called
moves) of both players. It can be represented using the matrix :
π c d
c (4,4) (0, 5)
d (5, 0) (1, 1)
where each entry eij is an ordered pair of real numbers. The two players are referred
to as the row player and the column player respectively. The actions of the first
player are identified with the rows of the matrix and those of the second one with the
columns. If the row player chooses action i and the second action j, the components
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of the ordered pair eij are the payoff received by the first and the second player
respectively. It is clear that if they could play cooperatively and make a binding
agreement, they would both play c. If the game is noncooperative, the best action
for each player is d.
Suppose now that we consider infinite repetitions of a noncooperative base game.
This game is just as noncooperative as the base one, but it allows a certain form
of interaction. Suppose that each player has a perfect knowledge of the previous
moves of all the others. Then his strategy may depend on these previous moves and
he may coordinate it with that of his opponents. For instance, if the base game is
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, grim-trigger is the strategy of cooperating in the first move
and until your adversary defects, then of always defecting after the first defection of
your opponent. Tit-for-tat is the strategy of playing at each step the action played
by your adversary at the previous one ; the initial move is free.
In this paper, we make use of infinite words to analyze the kind of games we
want to model. A match of such a game is represented as an infinite word on the
alphabet A of moves. In this context, a strategy for player i can be viewed as a
relation from the set of finite words on A to that of the actions of this player. The
whole strategy of the game is defined as the vector composed by using the strategies
of all players. We can associate to each strategy vector a language L of infinite
words on A, defined as the set of all matches that the players may make if everyone
follows the strategy he decided to apply.
Nash equilibrium is one of the most important notions in game theory. The
whole strategy of the game is defined as the vector composed by using the strategies
of all players. Intuitively, a strategy vector is a Nash equilibrium if one player’s
departure from it while the others remain faithful to it results in punishment. The
idea is that once the players start playing according to such a strategy vector, then
they all have a good reason to stay with it.
More precisely, our study will be organized as follows. In Sections 1 and 2, we
introduce some basic notions on words and game theory. In Section 3, we show that
the same language can be generated by several strategies. We call “strategical” a
language which is given by at least one strategy. Section 4 is devoted to the proof
of the existence of a minimal strategy for a strategical language, for which we give
an explicit description. The characterization of the family of strategical languages
as that of closed sets in the topological space of infinite words is given in Section
5. Finally, in Section 6, we give a definition of a Nash equilibrium for strategical
languages.
1 Words
A word is a finite sequence of elements of an alphabet A. We denote by A∗ the set
of all words on A. The length of a word w ∈ A∗, denoted by |w|, is the number of
letters of A composing w. Let a ∈ A. The empty word ǫ is the only word of length
zero. We denote by |w|a the number of the occurences of a in w. Given two words
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u, v ∈ A∗, we say that u is a factor of v if we have v ∈ A∗uA∗ and that u is a prefix
or a left factor of v if v ∈ uA∗
An infinite word on A is an infinite sequence h of elements of A, which we will write
h = h0h1 · · · ht · · ·. We denote by A
ω the set of all infinite words on A. Given a
word w ∈ A∗ and an infinite word h ∈ Aω, we say that w is a prefix or a left factor
of h if there exists an infinite word h′ ∈ Aω such that h = wh′.
If L is a subset of Aω, we denote by Prefk(L) the set of all words that are prefixes of
length k of words of L. We set Pref≥k(L) =
⋃
i≥k Prefi(L) and simply Pref(L) =
Pref≥0(L).
Finally, the left quotient of L by a finite word w is the subset w−1L of Aω defined
by w−1L = {h ∈ Aω|wh ∈ L}.
2 Mathematical model for games
Noncooperative games, in which moves consist of simultaneous actions of n players,
can be represented by a collection of n utility functions. The values of these functions
define the expected amount paid to the players. A game is a tuple G = (P,A, π)
where :
• P = {1, · · · , n}, n ∈ IN, is the set of players.
• Ai is the set of the actions for player i.
• A = A1 × . . .×An is the alphabet of the moves.
• πi : A −→ IR. is the utility function for player i.
• π = (π1, . . . , πn) : A −→ IR
n is the utility vector.
We consider in this paper the δ-discounted infinitely repeated game of G, which
we note by Gω. In such a game, we model a match h as an infinite sequence of
moves which can be represented by an infinite word on the alphabet of the moves A
: h = h0h1 · · · ht · · · ∈ A
ω.
The utility with discounting factor δ ∈ (0, 1) of a match h for player i is defined as :
πδi (h) = (1− δ)
∞∑
k=0
πi(hk)δ
k.
Example 2.1 As concerns the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, we have P = {1, 2},
A1 = A2 = {c, d}, A = {c, d} × {c, d} and the utility function is defined by the
matrix given in the Introduction. The infinite word h = (c, c)ω is an example of a
match in which the two players cooperate infinitely.
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3 Strategies and languages
A nondeterministic strategy σi for G
ω, is a relation from A∗ into Ai that describes
the behaviour of player i during the game. A strategy vector on A is the relation
σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) : A
∗ −→ A defined by :
(a1, . . . , an) ∈ σ(w) ⇐⇒ ai ∈ σi(w), ∀w ∈ A
∗, ∀ai ∈ Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Let Σ be the set of all strategy vectors on A. We consider now the map γ : Σ −→
P(Aω), where P(Aω) denotes the set of all languages in Aω, which associates to each
strategy σ ∈ Σ, the language of infinite words γ(σ) given by
γ(σ) = {h ∈ Aω| h0 ∈ σ(ǫ) and ht+1 ∈ σ(h0 · · · ht), ∀t ≥ 0}.
We also write σ → L to mean that L = γ(σ).
Example 3.1 We give a strategy for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
σ(w) =


{(c, c), (c, d)} if w ∈ (c, c)∗
{(d, c), (d, d)} if w ∈ (c, c)∗(c, d)((d, c) + (d, d))∗
∅ otherwise
It is usually called the ”grim-trigger” strategy. The language γ(σ) is described by
the ω-rational expression
(c, c)ω + (c, c)∗(c, d)((d, c) + (d, d))ω .
Example 3.2 Consider the following strategy σ on the alphabet A = {a, b} :
σ(w) =
{
{a, b} if | w |a<| w |b
b otherwise
The language γ(σ) associated is
{h ∈ Aω | Pref(h) ∈ {w ∈ A∗ | |w|a ≤ |w|b}}.
We note that this language is not ω-rational, in the sense of language theory.
Proposition 3.3 The application γ is neither injective, nor surjective, when | A |>
1.
Proof : Let A = A1 × . . .×An be the alphabet of the moves and let 1 ≤ i ≤ n such
that | Ai |≥ 2. Let aj ∈ Aj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and let bi ∈ Ai, bi 6= ai.
1. γ is not injective. Consider the strategies σ and σ′ defined as:
σ(w) =
{
(a1, . . . , an) if w ∈ (a1, . . . , an)
∗
∅ otherwise
and
σ′(w) =
{
(a1, . . . , an) if w ∈ (a1, . . . , an)
∗
A otherwise
Obviously σ and σ′(w) lead to the same language.
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2. γ is not surjective. Consider the language
L = (a1, . . . , ai, . . . an)
∗(a1, . . . , bi, . . . an)
ω, ai 6= bi
We claim that there is no strategy σ ∈ Σ verifying σ → L. Indeed, sup-
pose such a strategy exists. We then have necessarily (a1, . . . , ai, . . . an) ∈
σ((a1, . . . , ai, . . . an)
t) ∀t ≥ 0, as a consequence of the expression of L. Recall
the definition of L given at the beginning :
L = {h ∈ Aω|h0 ∈ σ(ǫ), ht+1 ∈ σ(h0 · · · ht) ∀t ≥ 0}.
It implies that (a1, . . . , ai, . . . an)
ω ∈ L, because this word satisfies the required
conditions, which leads us to a contradiction.
For a language L, we note S(L) = {σ ∈ Σ| σ −→ L}, the set of strategies
generating L.
Definition 3.4 A language L is strategical if there exists a strategy σ ∈ Σ such that
σ −→ L, that is if S(L) 6= ∅.
4 Minimal strategy
We define on the set Σ of strategies on the alphabet A the order relation given by :
σ ≤ σ′ ⇔ σ(w) ⊂ σ′(w), ∀w ∈ A∗.
It is obviuos to remark that for every family (σi)i∈I of strategies of Σ,
•
⋂
i∈I σi ∈ Σ;
•
⋂
i∈I σi ⊂ σj, ∀j ∈ I.
Among all the strategies giving a strategical language L, we consider a particular
one :
σL =
⋂
σ∈S(L)
σ.
We have the following result.
Proposition 4.1 If L is a strategical language, then σL is the smallest strategy
giving L. It will be called the minimal strategy of L.
Proof : It suffices to show that γ(σL) = L. It will then be obvious that σL is the
smallest one. We obtain successively :
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γ(σL) = {h ∈ A
ω| h0 ∈ σL(ǫ) and ht+1 ∈ σL(h0 . . . ht),∀t ≥ 0}
= {h ∈ Aω| h0 ∈
⋂
σ∈S(L) σ(ǫ) and ht+1 ∈
⋂
σ∈S(L) σ(h0 . . . ht), ∀t ≥ 0}
= {h ∈ Aω|h0 ∈ σ(ǫ) and ht+1 ∈ σ(h0 . . . ht), ∀t ≥ 0,∀σ ∈ S(L)}
=
⋂
σ∈S(L){h ∈ A
ω|h0 ∈ σ(ǫ) and ht+1 ∈ σ(h0 . . . ht), ∀t ≥ 0}
=
⋂
σ∈S(L) γ(σ)
=
⋂
σ∈S(L) L
= L.
Consider now the particular strategy σˆL defined as follows :
σˆL : A
∗ −→ A
w 7−→ Pref1(w
−1L).
Proposition 4.2 For every language L ⊂ Aω, we have L ⊂ γ(σˆL).
Proof : Let h = h0 . . . ht . . . ∈ L. We have succesively :
h0 ∈ Pref1(L) = Pref1(ǫ
−1L) = σˆL(ǫ),
ht+1 ∈ Pref1((h0 . . . ht)
−1h) ⊂ Pref1((h0 . . . ht)
−1L), ∀t ≥ 0.
Thus, h ∈ γ(σˆL).
To characterize strategical languages of Aω, we introduce a new operator. For
all subsets X ⊂ A∗, let
−→
X = {u ∈ Aω| u has infinitely many prefixes in X}.
Example 4.3 We give the value of
−→
X for some simple sets X ⊂ A∗.
1. If X = a∗b then
−→
X = ∅.
2. If X = (ab)+ then
−→
X = (ab)ω.
3. If X = (a+ b)∗b then
−→
X = (a∗b)ω
Theorem 4.4 L is strategical if and only if L =
−−−−−−→
Pref(L).
Proof : We first prove that condition is necessary. The inclusion L ⊂
−−−−−−→
Pref(L)
always holds.
Let now h ∈
−−−−−−→
Pref(L), then h has infinitely many prefixes in Pref(L) = {w ∈ A∗ |
∃x ∈ Aω : wx ∈ L}. This implies that: ∀n ≥ 0, ∃tn ≥ n, ∃x ∈ A
ω such that
h0 . . . htnx ∈ L. We know that there exists a strategy σ such that L = γ(σ). Thus,
L = {h ∈ Aω | h0 ∈ σ(ǫ) and ht+1 ∈ σ(h0 . . . ht), ∀t ≥ 0}. Hence: ∀n ≥ 0, ∃tn ≥ n
such that h0 ∈ σ(ǫ) and ht+1 ∈ σ(h0 . . . hi) ∀i, 0 ≤ i ≤ tn. This implies h0 ∈ σ(ǫ)
and hi+1 ∈ σ(h0 . . . hi), ∀i ≥ 0. Therefore h ∈ L.
We now prove the sufficient condition, that is L =
−−−−−−→
Pref(L) then γ(σˆL) = L. By
Proposition 4.2, we have only to establish the inclusion γ(σˆL) ⊂ L. Let h ∈ γ(σˆL).
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We have h0 ∈ σˆL(ǫ) and ht+1 ∈ σˆL((h0 . . . ht)
−1L, ∀t ≥ 0. That is, h0 ∈ Pref1(L)
and ht+1 ∈ Pref1((h0 . . . ht)
−1L), ∀t ≥ 0. It is clear that h0 ∈ Pref(L) and
∀t ≥ 0, h0 . . . ht ∈ Pref(L). It implies that h admits an infinite number of left
factors belonging to Pref(L). Then h ∈ L since L =
−−−−−−→
Pref(L).
The proof that the condition of the previous proposition is sufficient implies
the following result.
Corollary 4.5 If L is strategical, then L = γ(σˆL).
The results obtained so far can be summerized in this way :
Proposition 4.6 The following properties are equivalent :
• L is a strategical language.
• γ(σˆL) = L.
•
−−−−−−→
Pref(L) = L.
It is now possible to give an explicit description of the minimal strategy. In fact, for
a strategical language L, both strategies σˆL and σL coincide.
Proposition 4.7 For a strategical language L ⊂ Aω, we have σˆL = σL.
Proof : It suffices to show that σˆL ⊂ σL. Let w ∈ A
ω. We have σˆL(w) =
Pref1(w
−1L). Let x ∈ σˆL(w). Then wx ∈ Pref(L). So : ∃h ∈ L, ∃t ≥ 0
such that w = h0 . . . ht and x = ht+1. Since h ∈ γ(σL), we have necessarily
ht+1 ∈ σL(h0 . . . ht). Thus x ∈ σL(w).
5 Topological impact
We consider on the set Aω the distance d defined as follows :
d(x, y) = (1 +max{|w| | w ∈ Pref(x) ∩ Pref(y)})−1
with the convention 1/∞ = 0.
Proposition 5.1 Equipped with this distance, Aω is a complete metric space.
The next proposition is shown in [2,5].
Proposition 5.2 A language L ⊂ Aω is closed if and only if L =
−−−−−−→
Pref(L)
Corollary 5.3 L is strategical if and only if L is closed.
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It is usual to note L the smallest closed language containing L. Corollary 4.5 can
be generalized to any language of Aω in the following manner :
Proposition 5.4 For all language L ⊂ Aω, we have L = γ(σˆL).
Proof : Since we always have L ⊂ γ(σˆL), it is sufficient to prove that γ(σˆL) ⊂ L.
Consider a word h ∈ γ(σˆL). Recall that :
γ(σˆL) = {x ∈ A
ω | x0 ∈ σˆL(ǫ) and xt+1 ∈ σˆL(x0 · · · xt), ∀t ≥ 0}
= {x ∈ Aω | x0 ∈ Pref1(L) and xt+1 ∈ Pref1((x0 · · · xt)
−1L) ∀t ≥ 0}.
We have then : h0 ∈ Pref1(L) iff ∃y0 ∈ A
ω, h0y0 ∈ L and xt+1 ∈ Pref1((x0 · · · xt)
−1L)
iff ∃yt+1 ∈ A
ω, h0 . . . ht+1yt+1 ∈ L. It implies that : ∀t ≥ 0, ∃yt ∈ A
ω, h0 · · · htyt ∈
L. Define now the sequence (h(t)t)t≥0 of words of L given by h
(t) = h0 · · · htyt. It
appears clearly that it admits the word h as a limit. So h ∈ L.
6 Nash equilibrium
Intuitively, a strategy vector is a Nash equilibrium if no player has any interest in
leaving his strategy, while his opponents remain faithful to theirs. Let us first intro-
duce some basic notions, in order to give a formal definition of a Nash equilibrium.
Let α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ A. We call i-variation of α every β ∈ A such that αi 6= βi
and αj = βj ,∀j 6= i.
Let X be a language of Aω. We call i-variation of a match h = h0h1 . . . ht . . . in X
every match h ∈ X for which there exists t ≥ 0, an i-variation α of ht and a word
w ∈ Aω such that h = h0 . . . ht−1αw ∈ X.
A good match for player i in X is a match h ∈ X verifying πi(h) ≥ πi(h) for every
i-variation h of h. Denote by GMi(X) the set of all good matches for player i in X.
Example 6.1 Consider the language L = (c, c)ω + (d, d)ω. It is obvious that the
words (c, c)ω and (d, d)ω do not admit any i-variation in L. So we have GMi(L) =
L, ∀i = 1, 2.
Example 6.2 Let L = (d, d)ω +(d, d)∗(d, c)((c, c)+ (c, d))ω . This language involves
the Prisoner’s dilemma game strategy in which the first player defects as far as his
adversary defects and cooperates infinitely as soon as his opponent cooperates. We
claim that h = (d, c)(c, d)ω ∈ GM2(L) if δ > 1/5, otherwise (d, d)
ω ∈ GM2(L).
Indeed, let h be a 2-variation of h. Then h ∈ (d, d)ω + (d, d)∗((c, c) + (c, d))ω . But,
at the sight of the payment matrix given in the Introduction, we notice it pay more
for the second player always to choose d instead of c after his first cooperation. Thus,
we will only examine the 2-variations belonging to (d, d)ω + (d, d)∗(d, c)(c, d)ω . We
obtain successively for n ∈ IN :
πδ2((d, d)
n(d, c)(c, d)ω) = (1− δ)(
∑n
k=0 δ
k +
∑∞
k=n+2 5δ
k)
= (1− δ)[
∑n
k=0 δ
k + 5(
∑∞
k=0 δ
k −
∑n+1
k=0 δ
k)]
= 1− δn+1 + 5δn+2
= 1 + δn+1(5δ − 1).
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The case of h = (d, d)ω can be dropped when δ > 1/5, because we have 1+ δn+1(5δ−
1) > 1 = πδ2((d, d)
ω). Furthemore, one can easily verify that the maximum of the
function n 7−→ 1 + δn+1(5δ − 1) is reached for n = 0. Hence, the word (d, c)(c, d)ω
belongs to GM2(L).
The notion of Nash equilibrium also requires the introduction of some basic strategy
vectors. Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) be a strategy vector and let X = γ(σ) be the associated
language. We denote by̟i : A
∗ −→ Ai the unpredictable strategy for player i, given
by ̟i(w) = Ai, ∀w ∈ A
∗.
We define for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the following strategy vectors :
µ(i) = (̟1, . . . ,̟i−1, σi,̟i+1, . . . ,̟n)
ν(i) = (σ1, . . . , σi−1,̟i, σi+1, . . . , σn).
We denote by Xi the language γ(µ
(i)) and by Yi the language γ(ν
(i)).
Proposition 6.3 We have :
• X =
⋂
1≤i≤nXi;
• Yi =
⋂
j 6=iXj ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. For the first part, we obtain the succession of equations :
X = {h ∈ Aω| h0 ∈ σ(ǫ) and ht+1 ∈ σ(h0 . . . ht), ∀t ≥ 0}
= {h ∈ Aω| h0,i ∈ σi(ǫ) and ht+1,i ∈ σi(h0 . . . ht), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, ∀t ≥ 0}
=
⋂
1≤i≤n{h ∈ A
ω| h0,i ∈ σi(ǫ) and ht+1,i ∈ σi(h0 . . . ht), ∀t ≥ 0}
=
⋂
1≤i≤n γ(µ
(i))
=
⋂
1≤i≤nXi.
The second part of the proof is easier, since we immediately obtain by using the
lines above :
Yi = {h ∈ A
ω| h0,j ∈ σj(ǫ) and ht+1,j ∈ σj(h0 . . . ht), ∀t ≥ 0, ∀j 6= i}
=
⋂
j 6=i γ(µ
(j))
=
⋂
j 6=iXj .
Definition 6.4 A strategy vector σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is a Nash equilibrium if
n⋂
i=1
GMi(Yi) 6= ∅.
In other words, a strategy vector is a Nash equilibrium if there exists a match that
represents a good match for each player in the set of matches of the others [3]. In
particular, in the case of two players, the general definition becomes :
GM1(X2)
⋂
GM2(X1) 6= ∅.
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Example 6.5 We consider in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the vector σ = (σ1, σ2)
in which both players follow the grim-trigger strategy. In this case we have :
X1 = (c, c)
ω + (c, c)∗(c, d)((c, c), (d, d))ω ,
X2 = (c, c)
ω + (c, c)∗(d, c)((c, d), (d, d))ω .
We claim that (σ1, σ2) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the discounting factor
δ ≥ 1/4.
Indeed (c, c)ω ∈ GM1(X2)∩GM2(X1). Suppose h = (c, c)
k−1(c, d)(d, d)ω be a match
with defection of the first player at the rank k ≥ 0. We obtain after computations
πδ1(h) − π
δ
1(h) = δ
k(4δ − 1).
Then πδ1(h)−π
δ
1(h) ≤ iff δ ≤ 1/4, which proves that h ∈ GM1(X2) whenever δ ≥ 1/4.
In the same way, we can show that h ∈ GM2(X1).
Conclusion and perspectives
This paper was essentially devoted to a topological characterization of the family of
strategical languages. It also embeds a new definition of a Nash equilibrium that
uses infinite words.
Our purpose in the future will consist of analyzing more precisely the structure
of good matches sets, then the strategy vectors that admit Nash equilibria. We also
wish to study mixed strategies (with probabilities). It is obvious that this kind of
strategies involves the nondeterministic ones.
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